In deterring North Korea from pursuing its space ambitions, the neighbouring
Trespass to Airspace:
How to Deter North Korea from Its Space Ambitions?
I. Introduction
On December 12, 2012, the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (hereinafter North Korea; "DPRK") stunned the world with its space ambitions by attempting to launch an 'Earth-observation' satellite.
1 Although the international community has repeatedly condemned North Korea prior to the launch for breaching the United Nations Security Council ("UNSC") Resolutions 1718 2 and 1874, 3 North Korea's determination still remained unaffected. As today's space technology can be easily converted to manufacture ballistic missiles, it is a matter of concern that North Korea's space activities would eventually become a threat to the world security in the future. The primary objective of this research is to suggest a possible solution in effectively deterring North Korea from its growing space ambitions. This article consists of five parts including Introduction and Conclusion. Part two will present the overview of the present scenario by reviewing the history of North Korean space launches and the challenges that such activities can bring to the international security. Part three will examine the current international condemnations against North Korea for breaching the UNSC Resolutions 1718 and 1874. Here, the author will address that this UNSC argument cannot afford adequate deterrence to North Korea's ambitions. Part four will suggest that a more effective solution for North Korea's neighbouring countries is to advance a sovereignty argument that North Korea's satellite launching vehicles have trespassed to their territorial airspace. This part will also discuss a possible counter-argument of North Korea based on a "right of innocent passage" over foreign airspace for its space activates because North Korea is geographically disadvantaged from accessing the outer space without trespassing the territorial airspace of other countries. 
II. North Korea's Space Ambitions: An Overview

A. North Korea's Satellite Launches
To date, North Korea has made four attempts of launching satellites. Its first launch can be dated back to August 31, 1998 (hereinafter the 1998 launch), 4 which was observed to have been unsuccessful. At that time, the rocket was launched 'over' Japan 5 without prior notice or warnings in advance. 6 Although the launch was not successful, North Korea was severely criticized by the international community.
In particular, the International Civil Aviation Organization ("ICAO") commented that the satellite launch was "done in a way not compatible with [ 
B. International Concern
Because space technology is similar to ballistic missile technology, 33 satellite launch vehicles can easily be converted to ICBMs if the satellite payloads is replaced with war payloads. 34 Alternatively, such technologies can at least efficiently assist the ICBMs to be built. 35 Considering that North Korea has withdrawn from the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("NPT") on January 10, 2003, 36 the war payloads to be delivered by an ICBM can be thermonuclear warheads, biological weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction. Japan advocated, in a Security Council proceeding, that: "The combination of ballistic missile capability and, now, the claim of nuclear capability in the hands of a regime known for reckless irresponsible behaviour, created nothing less than a grave threat to peace and security." 37 Considering the current situation, North Korea's space ambitions must be a grave concern for the global peace and security and thus such activities should be effectively discouraged and deterred by the international Nevertheless, it should be recognized that the power of issuing authoritative interpretations of the UNSC Resolutions resides with the Council itself considering that "the right of giving an authoritative interpretation of a legal rule belongs solely to the person or body who has power to modify or suppress it."
56 Given that the UNSC has 'ratified' the aforementioned unilateral interpretation with a presidential statement which repeated the international condemnations, such interpretation would carry legal power; nonetheless, as stated above, the legal persuasiveness of such interpretation is highly debatable. In addition, Resolutions 1874 and 1718 may have other limitations. First, the UNSC Resolutions, unlike international treaties, used to be drafted to deal with specific matters for a short-term period. 57 Once the Resolutions are no longer in force, these arguments will accordingly fail. Second, as these Resolutions are only concerned with North Korea, they cannot deter other "States of concern" (e.g. Iran or Syria) from pursing their space ambitions. Consequently, although the UNSC Resolutions have seemingly made North Korea's satellite launches unlawful at this instance, they shall not be considered as an ultimate answer to this problem.
IV. Trespass to Sovereign Airspace
A. The Alternative Argument
In deterring North Korea's satellite launch, its neighbouring countries may advance a trespass to sovereign airspace claim, instead of solely relying on the UNSC approach. As a satellite launching vehicle will first move through the airspace of neighbouring countries before reaching outer space, 58 these States may rightly argue that North Korea's launching vehicles has trespassed to their territorial airspace infringing their sovereignty. Previously, this argument has been used by other States in various occasions. For instance, South Korea condemned North Korea for "invasion of Japanese air space" after North Korea's 1998 launch. 59 Similarly for the 2009 launch, 60 South Korea and Japan warned that they would intercept the rocket if it flew 'over' their territory. As North Korea always attaches great importance to its independence and sovereignty, it should also respect other State's sovereignty interests. North Korea has not yet raised any valid defense against foreign trespass claims. Instead, it has constructed a new launching site at its northwest corner named Tongchang-dong Missile and Space Launch Facility (or the Sohae Satellite Launching Station) 61 and changed the expected trajectory of the first 2012 launch from a path to the east which would pass over Japan 62 (which was adopted in its 1998 and 2009 launches) to a southerly trajectory over the Yellow Sea just west of South Korea, then to the east of the Philippines.
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This alteration is quite noticeable. To launch a satellite into orbit, the launching vehicles should be moved eastward so as to take advantage of the velocity of the Earth's rotation. 64 Otherwise, the vehicle should be more powerful and accurate (and therefore more costly) 65 to gain speed than those launching in the east. 66 Considering that North Korea is not in a highly advanced stage of space technology, the modified trajectory must raise the costs for its rocket and reduce its prospect of a successful launch. This means that North Korea has supposedly compromised with Japan's sovereignty interests. Even North Korea has explicitly explained that it has modified trajectory in order to "avoid other countries." 67 In the view of the above, a claim of trespass to airspace should effectively deter North Korea's space activities. 
B. Delimitation of Outer Space
The main difficulty of the above argument, however, is that the vertical limit of State sovereignty is still under dispute. Under contemporary international law, airspace is subject to "complete and exclusive sovereignty" 69 of nations, whereas outer space "is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty." 70 A question may arise on the delimitation between these two areas.
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There were four positions addressed on this issue. First, the physical point theory provides that the demarcation line should be drawn at the 'physical point' 75 Fourth, Functionalism maintained that space and air activities should be governed according to their nature, i.e., aeronautical activities by air law and space activities by space law. 76 Therefore, an arbitrary line is both artificial and unnecessary. 77 It is impractical, however, to arbitrarily classify a space shuttle as either a spacecraft or an aircraft. 78 The international community has reached to a general consensus that the demarcation line should be drawn at around 100-120 kilometres above the sea level. This consensus is not only the compromise of the abovementioned demarcation theories, but also is endorsed by space superpowers. In 1979, e.g., the former Soviet Union proposed that outer space begin at 100 to 110 kilometres above sea level. 79 
C. North Korea's Trespass
Considering the North Korea's geological location and size, it would be almost impossible to choose the launch azimuths without trespassing 'over' the neighbouring countries. 83 A trespass claim should be thus effective in providing adequate deterrence. 84 Even if North Korea alters its launching trajectory to the south to avoid Japan's territorial air space, the rocket will nonetheless trespass to South Korea's territorial air space as shown in the first 2012 launch. South Korea's Ministry of National Defence reported that the North Korean rocket of the first 2012 launch exploded at an altitude of 151 kilometres above the Baekryeong-do (island) and its debris then fell into the ocean at a distance 100 to 150 kilometres off the western South Korean coast. 86 A State's territorial sovereignty will include the air space above the territorial sea. 87 Because South Korea claims 12-mile's territorial sea, 88 North Korea's rocket was very likely to have flown above South Korea's territorial sea north to Baekryeong-do before achieving the altitude of 100-120 kilometres. This view is shared by some scholars, who observed that the North Korean rocket trajectory 'looks like' to have "overflown Baekryeong-do under 100 kilometers within two minutes after it was launched," and thus have "penetrated into the South Korean territorial airspace above Baekryeong-do."
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On the other hand, North Korea may argue that the trajectory for a space object to take-off is usually very steep. 90 If scientifically calculated, the distance between the Sohae Launching Station and the Baekryeong-do is only 210.7 kilometres. Then, North Korea's Unha-3 rocket (which used in the first 2012 launch) should have vertically travelled when achieving the altitude of 100-120 kilometres 91 from the launching site in order not to trespass South Korea's airspace.
[Emphasis added]
As a consequence, North Korea's neighbouring countries may argue that the North Korean launching activities would trespass to their territorial airspace. If so, the 'trespass claim' would be demonstrate its persuasiveness in deterring North Korea's satellite launch. In particular, it can (a) refute the moral high ground advocated by North Korea; (b) continue to stand after the UNSC Resolutions concerned are repealed in the future; and (c) deter other "States of concern" 93 with small territories (probably Syria) from pursuing similar space ambitions. 
V. Right of Innocent Passage
A. Issue
In response to the airspace sovereignty of neighboring countries, North Korea could advance a counter-argument based on the "right of innocent passage" over foreign airspace under international law. The following section will analyze this critical legal question by examining the relevant doctrine, State practices, and customary international law.
B. The Doctrine
Article 1 of the Outer Space Treaty provides that: "Outer space […] shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind [and] on a basis of equality." 94 Also, the freedom of using outer space includes free access to outer space. 95 Although outer space is free, 96 few States will be able to put a satellite into orbit without passing through the national airspace of other States. 97 If the right of innocent passage is denied, the 'space locked' States would be precluded from having free access to space. 98 In this case, only a limited number of States in the privileged position can profit from the freedom of outer space. Therefore, the right of innocent passage has to be granted to ensure that outer space can be freely accessed by every nation on an equal basis. 99 McDougal prefers an alternative approach by relying on a law of the sea analogy. 100 Since the sea is open to every nation in the international community, the freedom of navigation of high seas may also be enjoyed by land-locked States. 133 Russia has submitted that such laws are "currently in the process of being elaborated." 134 South Korea further argued that most of the countries did not raise any objection to the passage of space objects mainly because they simply did not have any information about the passage and no special disadvantage was reported in relation to the passage. 135 The ICAO, as also submitted to the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in 1986, mentioned that the right of innocent passage was a proposal that did not reflect existing law. 136 In the academic world, the existence of the right of innocent passage is also challenged by many commentators. 137 Reinhardt argued that the practical dangers to the neighbouring State are too profound, 138 and safety measures will have to be taken by any neighbouring State potentially affected, including evacuation of certain areas, or arrangements to clear the flight path below the space object from international aviation. 139 Terril also observed that many States are reluctant to give up the possibility of using their geographic location to gain economic benefits by demanding fees for overflight rights.
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Eventually, it is clear that the existing State practice is far from adequate to establish an international customary law on the right of innocent passage over foreign airspace.
E. How to Establish 'Innocence'?
The "right of innocent passage" of space objects can only be granted when: (a) such space objects are engaged in a space activity which is considered lawful; and (b) its 'innocence' has been evidenced. 141 If the definition of innocent passage in the high seas is adopted in interpreting the requirement of 'innocence' of space objects, then a passage can only be innocent if "it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the costal State."
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It is almost impossible for North Korea to satisfy this requirement by arguing that its overflying launching vehicles, which were in fact a cluster of military ballistic missiles, are fully 'innocent' in the sense that they are not "prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security" of Japan or South Korea. Thus, even if such right does exist, it will be highly unlikely for North Korea to rely on the right of innocent passage in justifying its space activities.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, the author has endeavored to suggest a possible solution in effectively deterring North Korea's growing space ambitions. In particular, it has firstly overviewed the present issue by reviewing the history of North Korean space launches and the challenges that such activities can bring to the international security. This paper then examined the current international condemnations against North Korea for breaching the UNSC Resolutions 1718 and 1874; it submitted that this UNSC argument cannot afford adequate deterrence to the present issue. Subsequently, the author has argued that a more effective solution is for North Korea's neighbouring countries to advance a sovereignty argument that North Korea's satellite launching vehicles have trespassed to their territorial airspace. Lastly, she has also criticized a possible counter-argument of North Korea regarding a "right of innocent passage" over foreign airspace for its space activates, which is unlikely to succeed.
As a conclusion, the author addressed that North Korea's satellite-launching attempts has contravened international law by, inter alia, trespassing the territorial airspace of North Korea's neighbouring countries. Whereas the current response of the UNSC is lawful, the international community or the UN may consider reinforcing their augments with a trespass to airspace, so as to effectively deter North Korea's space ambitions. Instead of using the UNSC Resolution-based arguments, North Korea's neighbouring countries should consider advancing a sovereignty argument that the North Korean overflying launching rockets have trespassed to their territorial airspace.
